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1 Introduction
If all the international debt Africaowes were cancelled
today and if aid trebled instantly, would there be an
immediate positive impact on the continent’s
developmental aspirations in general, and would
poverty be reduced significantly in particular? To
what extent are aid levels important in finding a
solution to Africa’s economic and social malaise?
How muchevidence exists that shows the correlation
between significant aid flows and improvements in
economic and social welfare in recipient countries?
Do institutions matter and to what extent does the
policy environment influence the degree to which
aid can improve conditions in the recipient countries?
Does the mode in which aid is transferred to sub-
Saharan Africa matter and what issues need to be
attended to in the current aid architecture to address
the seemingly growing, cruel realisation in the average
African country that, in spite of aid, the prospects of
attaining theMillenniumDevelopment Goals (MDGs)
by 2015 are gradually diminishing?
The above questions are particularly pertinent
in the light of increasing calls from a host of sources,
including The Global Plan to Achieve the
MillenniumDevelopment Goals, for increasing aid
flows to developing countries. I focus here on
experiences from Zambia, one of the poorest
countries in Africa where, despite significant aid
volumes, poverty levels are worsening, with life
expectancy having declined to a record low of
around 37 years. On the basis of the Zambian
experience, some broad conclusions are made
regarding what needs to be done both inAfrica and
among the continent’s donors.
2 Aid volume to Zambia
Zambia, which until three decades ago was one of
themost prosperous countries in sub-SaharanAfrica,
ranks today as one of theLeast DevelopedCountries.
At independence in 1964, the country’s richmineral
resources were well developed and during the first
ten years, world market conditions were generally
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Figure 1: Zambia’s Real GDP Growth: 1995–2003
favourable. The country’s fortunes were, however,
adversely affected by external shocks that came in
quick succession: first in 1973 when the price of oil
quadrupled, and next in 1974 when copper prices
declined considerably.By the early 1980s, it became
evident that the economy was in serious distress.
The country entered the 1990s with severe
socioeconomic difficulties and since 2000 we have
not seen much improvement. The economy has
remained undiversified and continues to exhibit
heavy dependence onmineral resources and exports,
in particular copper.As revealed inFigure 1, Zambia’s
growth record, from the long-termperspective, has
been depressing. TheGDP growth rate fell from an
average of 1.5 per cent in the 1970s to 1.4 per cent
in the 1980s and 0.3 per cent in the 1990s.
Other economic indicators also point to this
declining trend. Inflation, for example, has
registered a steady increase over the years, rising,
on average, from around 10 per cent in the 1970s
to about 70 per cent in the 1990s. The increase in
inflation, coupled with population growth which
was above theGDP growth rate during the 1990s,
resulted in a significant decline in real per capita
income. Zambia’s GDP per capita has actually been
significantly lower than the sub-Saharan African
levels (Figure 2).
National savings that are generally strategic to
overall growth have generally been insufficient to
spur the needed level of desirable investment. The
real gross fixed capital formation during the 1990s
averaged 12 per cent of real GDP, well below the
20 per cent associated with sustainable growth.
Against the depressing background above,
Zambia turned to aid to help it address both the
structural and socioeconomic difficulties that it
faces. As part of the conditionality for external
assistance, the government attempted in various
ways over the years to stabilise the economy.Despite
a series of liberalisation-focused structural
adjustment and economic stabilisation packages,
which were prescribed and supported by theWorld
Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund (IMF)
and to which Zambia’s major donors linked their
support, very little progress was registered even in
the years when economic growth occurred. The
period of the Structural Adjustment Programme
(SAP) recorded a significant decline in national
savings. Since the intensification of the reform
programme, formal sector employment,particularly
in the manufacturing sector, has declined. The
decline in income levels for the average Zambian
sparked escalating poverty levels in a country
classified as one of the poorest in the world. The
real face of poverty in Zambia is revealed from the
worsening shift in poverty indicators as revealed
in Table 1.
Generally, aid flows to Zambia have been
significant. Since the 1960s, aid to the country had
shown a steady increase, particularly during the
early 1990s when the country ranked as number
six amongAfrican country recipients in totalOfficial
Development Assistance (ODA). Table 2 presents
comparable statistics for Zambia and countries in
Eastern and Southern Africa, as well as for other
comparable sub-Saharan African countries. The
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Source: OECD Database (2005).
Figure 2: GDP Per Capita in Zambia and in Africa (US$ current)
table reveals Zambia’s comparably high proportion
ofODA in relation to the country’s Gross National
Income (GNI).
Notwithstanding the fluctuations in aid flows
to Zambia, the 1980s and 1990s showed a
remarkable increase from US$56m in 1973 to an
average of US$312m over the period 1977–89
during which time the country embarked on the
IMF/World Bank-supported SAP. Between 1990
and 1994, aid jumped to an average ofUS$951m.
It reached a record high of US$2,093m in 1995,
resulting in a growth rate of 172 per cent over the
previous year.This was largely because of the donor
countries’ satisfaction with the country’s transition
to multi-party democracy in 1991 and a more
intensive implementation of SAP thereafter.
However, the volume of aid declined by 70 per cent
to US$636m in 1996. Figure 3 presents the net
ODA disbursements to Zambia for selected years.
The period from 2000 to now has shown significant
fluctuations with respect to commitments, with
2003 registering the highest level (Figure 4).Grants,
compared with loans, have constituted a larger
share ofODA flows to Zambia, with the exception
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Table 1: Changes in Selected Poverty Indicators, 1996–8
Poverty indicators/measures 1996 1998
Income poverty
Overall poverty (%) (national poverty line) 69.2 72.9
Extreme poverty (%) (national poverty line) 53.2 57.9
Overall poverty (%) (less than $1/day) 72.6 n.a.
Health and nutrition poverty
Life expectancy at birth (years) 45.5 40.5
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 112 112
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1,000 live births) 202 202
Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births) 649* n.a.
Stunted children (%) 46 53
Knowledge poverty
Population 5 years and above with no education (%) 18 27
Primary age (7–13 years) attendance rates (%) 69 68
Primary grade (1–7) net attendance rates (%) 69 66
Security poverty/vulnerability
Percentage of households who engaged in the following coping strategies:
Received relief food 6 7
Ate wild foods only 10 18
Substituted ordinary meals with less nutritious meals 40 51
Reduced food intake 46 64
Reduced other household items 46 62
Borrowed informally 23 29
Borrowed formally 6 5
Lived on church charity 4 5
Lived on NGO charity 2 –
Pulled children out of school 4 9
Sold assets 11 15
Begged from friends, neighbours and relatives 29 58
Begged from streets 1 1
Human poverty
Human Poverty Index (HPI) (%) 36.9 37.9
Source: GRZ, PRSP, Lusaka, March 2002.
*The general conjecture is that maternal mortality rate has increased since 1996. n.a. – not applicable.
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of the 1978–82 period and during 1995. It is worth
noting that bilateral aid has been more significant
than multilateral assistance.
As earlier noted, the volume and composition
of external assistance to Zambia has been
conditioned principally by the country’s willingness
to reform its economy.With a few exceptions, the
pattern of aid flow correlates closely with the
country’s policy changes.During the first four years
after independence up to 1968, aid to Zambia
maintained a steady and upwardmovement.When
the government decided to expropriate foreign
assets through its policy of nationalisation, a
significant drop in external assistance was registered.
The UK, in particular, lowered its assistance
significantly. When the Zambian economy began
inmid-1974 to experience serious external shocks
caused mainly by the drop in the price of copper
and the increase in the price of oil, the donors
responded positively by increasing their aid to the
country. Over the 1974–80 period, for example,
external assistance to Zambia increased threefold.
When the IMF embarked on SAP worldwide in
1980, Zambia’s failure to design and implement an
acceptable structural reform package led to a
noticeable reduction in external support particularly
from the bilateral donors. When the country
adopted SAP over the 1983 to 1987 period, this
was rewarded with an appreciable increase in
external assistance and, expectedly, when the
government unilaterally decided to abandon the
IMF/World Bank-supported SAP in May 1987,
many donors significantly reduced their aid to the
country. Major donors like the USA, the UK and
Germany actually suspended their disbursements
completely.What this picture suggests is that during
the period when there was an absence of real
agreements with the major international financial
institutions with respect to economic reforms,major
bilateral donors also reduced or abandoned their
aid commitments to the country. A more recent
phenomenon that is particularly noteworthy is the
emergence of non-economic conditionalities,
principally those linked to questions of good
governance,human rights, and social considerations
(e.g. poverty reduction and alleviation).
3 Has aid made a difference?
3.1 The general picture
The Zambian case demonstrates that increased aid
flows, in themselves, neither secure improvement
in economic growth nor guarantee poverty
reduction – thus suggesting that a significant
increase in the volume of aid to the country would
not necessarily result in significant economic and
social welfare improvements. A look at the period
in Zambia when substantial external resource flows
were registered as a result of the country’s adherence
to SAP reveals that there was a clear absence of a
correlation between actual volumes received and
positive economic growth trends. Figure 5 shows
movements in the growth ofGDP (which is a proxy
for economic progress) and gross ODA. It is clear
that while the aid registered a positive increase in
almost 20 years of the 24-year time span, GDP
growth either grew marginally at best, or
significantly declined. What is particularly
noteworthy in the graph is that the GDP growth
pattern is often in the opposite direction from that
of the aid flow. And yet the many donor
Implications of a Major Increase in Aid to Africa: The Case of Zambia
49
Source: OECD Database (2005).
Figure 3: Net Disbursements of ODA to
Zambia for Selected Years (US$m at 2000
Prices and Exchange Rates)
Source: OECD Database extracted in February 2005.
Figure 4: Zambia: Destination of Official
Development Assistance and Official Aid –
Commitments*
Total (US$m)
Of which multilateral
2000 2001 2002 2003
*Figures not deflated
conditionalities that Zambia, over the years, had to
accept – and fulfill – principally concerned
prescribed benchmarks for ensuring economic
stabilisation and growth.
The lesson one can derive from the above is that,
to be effective and efficient, aid has to be received
and managed within an enabling policy
environment and that if such an environment fails
to take into account all the factors at play, little
progress is registered. For Zambia, policy choices
and the policy environment mattered and, to a
considerable extent, it is erroneous to heap all the
blame on the recipient country especially when
external support comes, as it did in this case, with
conditionalities that may have been insensitive to
the following aspects:
● the nature of the economy being assisted and
the right mix of policies, the speed of their
introduction, and the sequencing of
interventions;
● institutional capacity of the recipient;
● the level of commitment of the one extending
aid with respect to fulfilling the promises made;
and
● the nature of the aid being offered and the
modality of its disbursement andmanagement.
In principle, there is nothing intrinsically faulty
in the policy of liberalisation (to which aid flows
were linked in the case of Zambia) and, therefore,
to tie external assistance to it is in a country that
has a malfunctioning, state-dominated economic
sector would seem to be themost rational thing to
do. Having said that, however, the process that is
used to correct the debilitating condition matters.
It is like a case of a seriously sick patient whose
disease has rather belatedly been correctly diagnosed
and the right remedy identified, but who is left in
the hands of an under-qualified doctor to manage
under an ill-equipped hospital conditions.When
the patient dies, the attribution of death becomes
rather tricky. Should you blame the patient for
seeking treatment too late; should the doctor be
blamed for being under-qualified; is the poor
hospital environment to blame; was the medicine
itself inappropriate?When one listens to different
analysts of Zambia, one often gets the impression
that when one blames the IMF, theWorld Bank and
donors for having “messed-up”Zambia, the country
(or, rather, the government) is exonerated from the
blame. Similarly, when one listens to the amount
of blame extended to the country for having failed
to provide ahospitable environment for a flourishing
private sector under a liberalised regime, the
impression often conveyed is that the external
supporters did everything right but the problem
was internal to the recipient.Consequently, because
of attempts to find someone to blame for themess,
realism is often lost with respect to how best to
address the problem. And yet, in most cases, both
parties to the aid relationship deserve a share of the
blame.Unless the problem of aid ineffectiveness is
addressed outside the “isms” that tend to colour
much commentary, there is very little likelihood
that an informeddebate will emerge that will inform
the decisions needed to improve effectiveness. The
challenges must be addressed on both the donor
and recipient sides. The article now turns to this
theme.
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Figure 5: GDP and Aid Growth Rates (%)
Source: Graph derived from data from OECD’s geographical distribution of financial flows to developing
countries 1998, CD-ROM.
3.2 The donor side
While Zambia has recorded above-average aid
receipts, a significant amount of which was fuelled
by adherence to SAP, it is clear that, overall, policy
design and implementation were faulty.There were
evident problems in synchronising the SAP
measures that were taken, resulting in delays of
several years in price stabilisation. Many analysts
agree that:
strong fiscal measures were upstaged in Zambia,
to some extent, by the decision to prematurely
liberalize the capital accounts. Combined with
exchange rate devaluation, this decision led to
a prolongation of Zambia’s inflation. This, in
turn, eroded the real growth of tax revenues,
undercutting fiscal austerity. In turn, delays in
stabilizing the economy extended the period of
stagnant growth, distracting policymakers from
undertaking much-needed structural reforms.
(AfDB/OECD 2003)
Structurally, Zambia’s economy changed little
in spite of the reforms and in spite of significant aid
flows. Economic growth has remained elusive.
Some of the main agents of the reforms in
Zambia, including theWorld Bank, now agree that
too many adjustments were attempted at once
without proper care being taken to complement
them with tight fiscal andmonetary policies aimed
at (for example) controlling inflation. Besides this,
the promised foreign exchange support fromdonors
that was required to sustain one of the important
instruments of financial sector liberalisation (the
auction system) was erratic.As Edward Jaycox, the
World Bank Vice-President who was in charge of
the African region, later conceded:
Zambia’s was a terribly under-funded
Programme.We overestimated copper revenue,
overestimated aid flows, and did everything we
could to paint apicture of an internally consistent
financing plan based on the resources that we
and others could bring to bear. If the case had
been looked at more closely or more sceptically,
the plan’s lack of realism would have become
apparent. A great number of shocks took place
as the adjustment process went along: copper
prices went down or stayed at the same level
when they were expected to go up; aid that was
expected did not arrive; deals with the Paris Club
that were normative weremade less liberal when
the aid was increased ... In sum, the Zambian
Programme was administered in a very chaotic
way, and the chaos resulted in part from the
inadequacy of financing and unrealistic financing
projections. (Jaycox 1991)
In fact, SAP implementation inZambia was often
piecemeal and the programme failed to alter
fundamentally the country’s economic structure.
In particular, the design of SAP did little to address
the poverty challenges that increasingly became
evident as the structural changes took hold. To a
considerable degree, donors targeted their aid
towards helping Zambia stay current with its
external debt obligations, in addition tomeeting a
significant part of the country’s most pressing
balance-of-payment needs. Indeed, as a result of
external support, Zambia managed to restructure
its external obligations – thus, for example,
increasing the ratio of concessional to commercial
debt from9-to-1 in 1990 to over 100-to-1 in 1999.
The case of privatisationmost poignantly reveals
the cost of speedwhen reforming an economy where
there was hardly any private sector to talk about
prior to reforms.The productivity and employment
record of the privatised sector has raised serious
concerns regarding what the “missing link” could
be. The results of a World Bank post-privatisation
evaluation of non-mining enterprises in Zambia
(Serlemitsos and Fusco 2001) revealed a rather
depressing record in the areas of productivity and
employment generation,particularly for those small-
and medium-scale enterprises that were acquired
by Zambians.
3.3 The recipient side
It is increasingly being recognised that one of the
most important prerequisites to effective aid
management is a functional and well-thought-out
national institutional framework within which
external resources aremobilised and finally utilised
in a way that safeguards the country’s priorities.The
typical donor-aided project in Zambia has received
limited guidance from the government at almost all
the levels of its circle. For reasons not readily
apparent, the Zambian government has generally
tended to place considerable faith in the donors in
the definition of what is required and how best it
could be attained. The era of structural adjustment
was particularly noteworthy in this regard.Although
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external pressure-cum-conditionalities clearly played
a significant role in policy choices and speed of
implementation, Zambia generally stood out among
other developing countries for following external
prescriptions almost religiously.Zambia was actually
“credited” by theWorld Bank for being the fastest
privatising country in Africa at a time when the
requisite capacity tomanage theprivatisationprocess
meaningfully was generally weak and the chaos that
followed testified to this.
Evidence suggests that because of the absence
of sufficient political will and technical/management
skill to guide donor activities; weak institutional
structures; low analytical capacity; and lack of policy
clarity in some cases (there is presently no aid policy
in Zambia), the government has often found it
difficult to “voice” its concerns or offer an alternative
developmental agenda to that of external actors –
even in cases where it believes the interests of the
country are not best served by the prescribed
remedies. Inadequate and unreliable policy-cum-
planning databases and poor financial management
and accounting systems have also tended to threaten
accountability and, thus to encourage donors either
to include capacity-threatening “gate-keeping”
functions in their aid support and/or to go around
the government system altogether by creating
parallel project management and implementation
systems and structures, including the general donor
insistence to open separate accounts for their
supported projects/programmes.
The analytical capacity of the aid coordination
institutions in the country is generally limited to
the collection of basic data on aid flows – with very
little effort towards policy-relevant analyses that
would guide government to interact more effectively
with donors with respect to its developmental
priorities, in general, and poverty reduction, in
particular. Behind these shortcomings lie the lack
of adequate, well-trained, remunerated,motivated
and experienced personnel that can perform the
basic functions of aid coordination and
management. The existence of a multiplicity of
donor procedures, demands and conditionalities
has worsened the capacity difficulties of the
government as it has tended to generate an overload
on the already ill-equipped and overstretched state
bureaucracy whose aid absorptive capacity is clearly
weak. The evident lack of cooperation among
different and functionally disjointed wings of
government that include the Ministry of Finance
andNational Planning (MFNP), theBank ofZambia,
other sectoral ministries and statutory bodies has
further worsened the situation. These arms of
government have continued to receive aid with only
a rudimentary systemof reporting to the supposedly
central coordinating body (theMinistry of Finance
andNational Planning).How increased aid volumes
can make a noticeable difference under such
conditions is clearly debatable.
The weaknesses identified above in the processes
of aid management under the current conditions
in Zambia have resulted in the marginalisation of
external resources in national planning and
budgeting. Although the periodic Consultative
Group (CG)meetings betweenZambia and its main
external resource providers do allow for a certain
degree of dialogue on the setting of priority areas
for aid intervention, such consultations and the
timing of the disbursement of pledged resources
are still not adequately synchronised.Consequently,
not only is it difficult to integrate external aid and
national development planning and budgeting but,
equally important, counterpart funds required to
be sourced from the government’s internally
generated revenue for the purpose of
complementing external flows are often non-
existent or have to be obtained fromextra-budgetary
sources. This has continued to threaten the
effectiveness of donor-supported interventions.
More recently, improvement in public
expenditure management has become a priority in
Zambia and a series of efforts are currently on course
at this level. The Medium Term Expenditure
Framework (MTEF) is perceived as a key element
of fiscal discipline that integrates policy making with
economic planning and budgeting in the context of
a three-year budget cycle. Through MTEF, the
government aims to ensure that expenditure
programmes are drivenby strategicpriorities, choices
and hard budget constraints.The importance of the
MTEF has to be understood in the context of the
long-standing challenges of financial management
in Zambia that have been characterised by the lack
of effective links between policies, programmes,
projects and budgeting; non-coherent expenditure
patterns; the need for government expenditure that
is predictable with set targets and goals; the need
for accountability and transparency in running
public affairs (and the associated challenges brought
about by corruption); and the importance of having
an expenditure framework that guides choices and
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priorities. Supplementing MTEF is the Integrated
FinancialManagement Information System (IFMIS)
that Zambia is building. Complementary to these
initiatives, the government has developed thePoverty
Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) which has been
operational in the past three years. Its real impact
on social welfare is, however, yet to be ascertained.
4 Emerging opportunities for
Africa?
The Zambian case raises a number of challenges
with respect to the improvement of the aid
architecture so as to ensure that increased aid
volumes to Africa make a difference to the
continent’s developmental aspirations. In an effort
to address the challenges of aid effectiveness at the
global level, there is the growing recognition of the
importance of harmonisation among and within
the main players in the donor-recipient interface,
so that their collective actions are coordinated in a
way that avoids undesirable duplication of effort
that tends to inflate the transaction costs on both
sides of the aid relationship. The list of suspects for
this state of affairs include the proliferation of
uncoordinated projects, the high administrative
costs, the lack of country ownership (as suggested
in theZambian case above), cost and time overruns,
and a disappointing record of sustainability – all of
which have been both the causes and effects of poor
aid management in many African countries. There
is also a growing recognition that themanagement
of different donor procedures has resulted in
unbearable transaction costs, particularly for the
most aid-dependent developing countries ofAfrica.
The adherence to a multiplicity of donor
requirements is perceived to be capacity draining,
let alone its threat to the local ownership over
recipient countries’ own development agendas –
problems that have evidently compromised effective
publicmanagement.
Drawing lessons from the Zambian case, it is
apparent that opportunities for improving aid
effectiveness exist when a number of realities are
appreciated by both the recipients and donors. It is
important to recognise at the outset that donor aid
is an exceptional resource which creates exceptional
demands on recipient institutions beyond the
national agendas of managing domestic resources.
To reduce the additionalburdenof imposing adonor
agenda on African systems, some key guiding
principles are worth taking into account.
First, compatibility with the development aspirations
of Africa is of essence. This entails ensuring that
donor policies and procedures are within the
national policy framework that is developed through
a consultative process and that no additional specific
policy conditionalities are unduly added outside
the agreed frame of cooperation. This also means
that aid should be delivered andmonitored through
the existing public sector management system in
the samemanner as domestic resources are handled.
Sector programme approaches (as opposed to
projects) seem to hold promise for compatibility
enhancement because they provide an overall policy
and programme framework with agreed outputs
and performance indicators for monitoring.
Second, simplicity is called for. This means that
aid delivery should not introduce complex
procedures and/or management structures for
implementation, monitoring, reporting and
evaluation. It alsomeans agreeing on few, simple and
realistic performance targets and focusing on these.
Too wide an agenda and amultiplicity of complex
structures would increase prospects of failure
especially in the least developed countries where
existing government systems are still quite frail.
Third, what is embarked upon should be
achievable. This means that policy conditions and
programme targets should be decided upon ex-
ante, with due consideration for capacity to achieve
them.Achievable outputs/targets should be guided
less by wishful thinking and more by what can
realistically be realised within a given timeframe.
Many grand externally prescribed economic
restructuring programmes in the Zambian case fell
short of expected outcomes simply because
achievability received little consideration due to,
inter alia, the government’s lack of capacity to
implement otherwise good plans and the attempt
by those that handed down the prescriptions to use
complex implementation procedures and reporting
and monitoring systems. In many cases, planned
outputs far exceed the recipients’ capacity to deliver,
often with serious consequences to the targeted
economies. Complex structures such as donor-
funded and technical assistance-staffed programme
management units are often put in place as parallel
structures charged withmanagement,monitoring
and reporting tasks, and applying systems that are
incompatible with the recipient governments’ way
of doing things – this, simply, will not do.
Lastly, to improve the quality of aidmanagement
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structures, donors should also invest in the
development of their own human capital, capacities
and institutions to improve their ability to
understand their location in the aid architecture.
Up to now, the question of capacity building has
been seen as necessary mainly in the recipient camp
and rarely are issues raised regarding the
effectiveness and appropriateness of the donors’
own aid structures and the competencies of their
personnel. Consequently, the review of donors’
modus operandi has often been done as a mere in-
house process by donors in their respective agency
headquarters. Rarely are the results made known
to the recipients, let alone brought out during the
donor-recipient dialogues on how to improve aid
effectiveness. This “them/us” syndrome in the
donor/recipient interface is rarely recognised as one
of the real challenges that ought to be addressed in
the debate to improve aid effectiveness. The simple
reality is that, to realisemore focused and pro-poor
strategies,multilateral and bilateral donor staff that
are at headquarters and those posted to recipient
countries ought to possess sufficient and relevant
experience and training to formulate and apply
strategies that are relevant, practical, and feasible.
Capacity building within the donor camp is
therefore essential, as is interaction with their
recipient “partners” during this process – both for
mutually beneficial openness and for confidence
building in the donor/recipient interface.
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